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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

18 March 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BOARD

SUBJECT: Post-Mortem of NIE Production for the Period
1 July to 31 December 1954

1. There is attached as Enclosure A a draft of a review of intelligence deficiencies noted in NIE production for the period 1 July to 31 December 1954. This has been prepared in compliance with the IAC action of 11 May 1954 (IAC-M-151) directing that such a paper be produced semi-annually.

2. It is recommended that the Board review this draft and discuss it with the IAC representatives in order that a final report may be submitted to the IAC for noting at an early date.



Chief, Estimates Staff


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Closure A
Revised Draft
IAC-D-57/4
18 March 1955

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Post-Mortem of NIE Production for the Period
1 July to 31 December 1954

This review of intelligence deficiencies has been based on the production of the last six months of 1954 and is limited to those estimates in which specific gaps were revealed. The remaining estimates are listed separately at the end of the paper. The deficiencies noted in this study identify areas in which intelligence information is inadequate due either to gaps in collection or in research and analysis. No attempt is made to deal with the validity of substantive judgments made in the estimates. Papers are reviewed in the regular sequence of the numbered series in which they fall and no order of priority is implied. Gaps noted at the time of production which have since been closed have been omitted.

General

There continue to be significant deficiencies in our intelligence information, notably on the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The gaps in this

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Approved For Release 2005/08/24 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000500010003-8

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area are largely due to the great difficulties of collection in the face of the stringent security policies of the Communist countries. More effective exploitation of available information is also desirable. In most non-Communist areas, notably in Western Europe and Latin America, the problem is more one of research and analysis than collection since great quantities of data are available.

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Approved For Release 2005/08/24 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000500010003-8

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Other Estimates

The following estimates, also produced in this period, have not been included in the above review since they either did not reveal notable gaps in information or called for broad intelligence judgments not involving deficiencies in collection or research.

NIE 23-54	"Probable Developments in West Germany" (20 December 1954) SECRET
NIE 25-54	"Probable Developments in Austria" (21 September 1954) TOP SECRET
NIE 34-54	"Probable Developments in Iran through 1955" (7 December 1954) SECRET
NIE 43-54	"Probable Developments in Taiwan through Mid-1956" (14 September 1954) SECRET
NIE 80-54	"The Caribbean Republics" (24 August 1954) SECRET
SNIE 100-4-54	"The Situation with Respect to Certain Islands Off the Coast of Mainland China" (4 September 1954) TOP SECRET
SNIE 100-4/1-54	"The Situation with Respect to the Nationalist Occupied Islands Off the Coast of Mainland China" (10 September 1954) TOP SECRET
SNIE 100-6-54	"World Reactions to Certain Possible US Courses of Action Against Communist China" (28 November 1954) TOP SECRET

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